For nearly forty years, economic growth in Greece has been weak. Recently, moreover, this country is suffering from a persisting economic crisis that goes beyond the usual business cycle recessions. In this paper, we develop a neoclassical growth model of market and political power interactions that captures the main features of the economic and political system of Greece. The model incorporates the insiders-outsiders labor market structure and the concept of an elite government. Outsiders form a group of workers that supply labor to a competitive private sector. And, insiders form a group of workers that enjoy market power in supplying labor to the public sector and influence the policy decisions of government, including those that affect the development and maintenance of public sector infrastructures. This leads to labor misallocation and inefficient fiscal policies. Thus, despite the fact that expanding public sector output has a positive effect on growth, eventually this is counterbalanced by the labor misallocation and inefficient tax policy outcomes. The interaction of these effects, over time, explains the dismal growth performance of Greece and reveals as an important factor behind its present crisis, the existence of a growth reversal phenomenon. The model proposed in this paper may be applicable for other countries that have a similar politicoeconomic structure with Greece, namely other Southern European countries. JEL classification: P16; O43; J45; O52 1 "Too many politicians and economists blame austerity -urged by Greece's creditorsfor the collapse of the Greek economy. But the data show neither marked austerity by historical standards nor government cutbacks severe enough to explain the huge job losses. What the data do show are economic ills rooted in the values and beliefs of Greek society. Greece's public sector is rife with clientelism (to gain votes) and cronyism (to gain favors)far more so than in other parts of Europe". Edmund S. Phelps, 2006 Nobel laureate in Economics, Project Syndicate, September 4, 2015. Link: http://www.projectsyndicate.org/columnist/edmund-s--phelps 4 Total government spending as a share to GDP in the pre-crisis year 2007 in Greece was 46.93%. This is not much higher relative to the Eurozone 15 average of 45.33, but considerably higher than the OECD average of 39.01.
INTRODUCTION
Plotted in Figures 1a and 1b , respectively, are the real per capita GDP and its smooth trend component, in Greece and the OECD average, since 1970. 1 As shown in Figure 1a , the recession that plagued recently most OECD countries, was deeper and more protracted, in Greece, evolving to a genuine crisis. The economics profession largely regards the Greek crisis as a sovereign debt crisis, manifested in the unprecedented increase of the actual public debt to GDP ratio, depicted in Figure 2 . 2 There is no doubt, then, that a major contributor to this increase is the dismal growth performance of Greece, since the late seventies. The latter is not limited only to the negative growth since the beginning of the crisis, but also on the divergence in the GDP per capita path of Greece relative to that of the OECD average, since the late seventies. 3 Also plotted in Figure 2 is what the public debt to GDP in Greece would have looked like in the counterfactual case where GDP after 1979 was growing at the OECD average rate. Clearly, the extremely high actual public debt to GDP ratio in Greece is a consequence of the prolonged weak growth, illustrated in Figure 1 . In this paper, we develop a model that explains this divergent behavior of Greek GDP and the subsequent growth reversal in the years of the crisis. As a starting point, we should accept that such a model should be consistent with the underlying structure of the Greek economy.
1 See Data Appendix for data sources and methods. 2 The Greek sovereign debt crisis is manifested in the high and unsustainable levels of the debt to GDP ratio in the sense of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) . Blanchard (2015) , for example, writes: "Even before the 2010 (first bailout) program, debt in Greece was 300 billion euros, or 130% of GDP. The deficit was 36 billion euros, or 15½ % of GDP. Debt was increasing at 12% a year, and this was clearly unsustainable". This literature emphasizes various aspects of the causes and remedies of the deep recession, such as: debt dynamics (see, e.g., House and Tesar (2015) and Schumacher and Weder di Mauro (2015) , external dependence and sudden stop issues (see, e.g., Gross (2013) and Reinhart and Trebesch (2015) , Gourinchas, et al. (2016) ), contagion effects (e.g., Mink and De Haan (2013) ), political economy aspects of the policies selected by national, supranational and international institutions to deal with the crisis (see, e.g., DeGrawe (2013) and Ardagna and Caselli (2014) ), bargaining outcomes in dealing with the crisis and the role of austerity (e.g., Zettelmeyer et al. (2013) ) and the interaction between external government debt crisis and a bank run prolonging the ensuing recession (e.g., Arellano et al. (2015) ). For a narrative of the Greek crisis see also Economides et al. (2016) and Bulow and Rogoff (2015) . 3 The dismal growth performance of Greece has been documented in a number of studies, including: Alogoskoufis (1995) , Bosworth and Kollintzas (2001) , Kollintzas, et al. (2012) , Gogos, et al. (2014) and Campos et al. (2014) . The structure of the economic and political systems of Greece is characterized by a relatively large public sector, with basic networks and utility services provided by government and more importantly by agencies or firms that, on the one hand, are heavily regulated and, on the other hand, labor therein is organized in powerful independent unions. 4, 5 Moreover, there are important strategic 3 interactions between these unions and the government that give rise to a high spending bias and consequently for high taxes and/or high debt accumulation. 6 Figure 3 presents evidence on the importance of the role of the state and public sector unions in the economy. More specifically, Figure 3a plots OECD's State Control index. This is a composite index incorporating information on the extend of public ownership, government involvement in network sectors, direct control over enterprises, governance of state owned enterprises and state's involvement in business operations.
Greece is characterized by the highest degree of state control, with the other Southern European countries making up the top five in the list. Figure 3b plots the ratio of the union densities in the public relative to the private sector, which is a proxy for the relative strength of public sector unions. Again, Greece ranks very high, surpassed only by three Anglo Saxon countries, where private sector union densities are relatively very low, while the picture of the other Southern European countries is mixed. 7
Figure 3. State Control Index and Union Density in the Public over the Private Sector
Note: Data sources and definitions in the Appendix.
However, it is not so much the size of the government that is in question, here, but the fact that the Greek state is widely taken to be one of the most interfering in the workings of the economy (See, e.g., the OECD study by Koske, et al. (2015) ). 5 Chapter 1 of the "Industrial Relations in Europe 2012" extensive report of the European Commission (2013) places Greece along with other Southern European countries in the industrial relations system cluster, referred to as "statecentered." And, in Chapter 3, the same cluster of countries is identified when it comes to public sector industrial relations. Similar classifications with respect to wage bargaining institutions have been made in Visser (2013) and European Commission (2014) . 6 This interaction has been recognized in the political science literature since the late seventies (Schmitter (1977) , Sargent (1985) , Cawson (1986) ) and recently has been explicitly pointed out for Greece by Featherstone (2008) . 7 Further empirical evidence on the insidersoutsiders society structure of Greece and other countries is provided in Kollintzas et al. (2016) . 5 and Solow (1981) and Oswald (1983) . Since there are as many independent unions of insiders as there are intermediate good producers, overall equilibrium in the market for insiders' labor is characterized by a Nash equilibrium among all insiders' unions. This modeling choice is, again, consistent with Greek labor market institutions, as well as those of other Southern European countries, where the wage setting process in the public sector is characterized by trade union fragmentation and, at the same time, lack of co-ordination. 9 This is quite different from other typically identified country clusters. For example, in Anglo-Saxon countries wage bargaining is thought, in general, to be competitive and labor unions are thought to play a relatively small role in wage setting. On the other hand, in the Nordic countries, labor unions in all sectors are thought to be powerful but cooperative, thereby internalizing the externalities associated with a high wage premium of one industry/sector on the rest. 10 In the symmetric equilibrium case, given reasonable parameter restrictions, the ratio of the wage rate of insiders over that of the outsiders (i.e., the public sector wage premium) is greater than one and increasing in the degree intermediate goods are gross complements, as well as in the number of publicly provided intermediate goods. Moreover, the wage premium and the ratio of employment in the public sector over total employment are inversely related, giving rise to the "labor misallocation effect". For a fixed number of insiders' unions, this model is formally equivalent to a standard Cass-Koopmans neoclassical growth model, where Total Factor Productivity (TFP) declines with the wage premium, but increases with the number of intermediate goods, as the "variety" effect dominates over the "labor misallocation" effect. However, the overall effects on steady state capital, output and growth towards the steady state, depend on the after-tax labor productivity. For it is assumed that the underlying infrastructure, associated with the publicly provided intermediate goods, is financed by a distortionary income tax. Then, it is shown that the effect of an increase in the number of publicly provided intermediate goods on steady state output and growth towards this steady state is negative (positive), depending on the existing number of publicly provided intermediate goods. If this number is higher or lower than a certain threshold, the combination of the "labor misallocation" and the tax distortion effects dominates over (is dominated by) the "variety" effect. All this being quite plausible, as the "variety" effect decreases, and the "labor misallocation" and tax distortion effects both increase with the existing number of publicly provided intermediate goods, i.e., public sector expansion.
Further, if the number of publicly provided intermediate goods is allowed to vary, each group of insiders union realizes that it has a common interest with all other groups of insiders unions in controlling/influencing the number of publicly provided intermediate goods. Hence, it is to the 6 interest of all insiders' unions to cooperate so as to control/influence government and its budget. For that matter, we consider a politicoeconomic equilibrium defined as the solution to the problem of a government, seeking to maximize an objective function, that to some degree is influenced by representative household preferences and is likewise influenced by insiders' unions preferences.
This maximization is subject to the underlying economic equilibrium and the government budget constraint. Under plausible restrictions, we prove that such a politicoeconomic equilibrium exists and is characterized by a steady state which is globally asymptotically stable. Moreover, it is shown that such politicoeconomic equilibrium will be characterized by a number of publicly provided intermediate goods that is greater the greater is the influence of insiders. This, in turn, implies that such a politicoeconomic equilibrium will be supported by a higher (distortionary) income tax rate and/or debt level, the greater is the influence of insiders. This is the "political effect" that, depending on the number of publicly provided intermediate goods, may further reduce steady state capital, output, and output growth towards the steady state. It follows, therefore, that, to the degree that the political and economic system of a country is like the insiders-outsiders society of this model, it would exhibit a relatively high wage premium in the public sector, low public to total employment ratio, and lower steady state after-tax total factor productivity, capital, output and growth towards this steady state.
So we have two results: First, a government influenced by insiders will choose a higher number of publicly provided intermediate goods and second, after-tax total factor productivity rises or falls depending on whether this number is lower or higher than a certain threshold. It is the combination of these two results, that leads to the model's prediction that countries which behave sufficiently close to an insidersoutsiders society: First, will have a lower steady state growth, and second, in what concerns transition towards this steady state, although they may enjoy relatively high growth early on, will eventually suffer from a growth reversal.
Hence, following the potential growth reversal outcome predicted by our model, we view the Greek crisis as a consequence of the insiders-outsiders organization of society. Since debt could be easily introduced in this model, without affecting the qualitative results, our model has also implications for the unsustainable Greek sovereign debt. 11 First, obviously, a growth reversal would increase the debt to GDP ratio by reducing the denominator. Second, the growth reversal itself is driven by the dominance of the labor misallocation and tax distortion effects over the growth 11 A taxation-debt channel could be introduced in a number of ways. For example, it can be easily verified that, in a small open economy version of our model, whereby borrowing interest rates are an increasing function of the outstanding debt to GDP ratio, there will be a uniquely determined steady state of this ratio. And, an increase in the number of publicly provided intermediate goods will lead to an increase in this debt ratio, as well as the income tax. The proportion of tax to debt financing will depend on the rate at which interest rates increase with the debt do GDP ratio. We do not pursue this extension here, since this would have come to the cost of sacrificing the analytic results on growth. 7 enhancing effect of public sector expansion. This dominance is driven by higher taxes needed to finance the expansion and maintenance of public sector infrastructures that will ensure and provide for high wages in the public sector. For an economy that lies on the "slippery" side of the Laffer curve, as Greece seems to be, this would imply an increase in debt. 12 Consequently, an insidersoutsiders society will further increase the debt to GDP ratio by increasing the numerator.
The results of this paper relate to several different strands of the literature on political economy, public finance, growth and European integration. First, it relates to the rent seeking / special interests political economy literature. In particular, it incorporates two basic ideas of that literature. First, that insiders seek rents from the political system for their own benefit and that the agents of the political system accommodate these demands in pursuit of their economic and political goals. Second, that, once the political system allows it, rent seekers are formed in groups, so as to take advantage of their common interests in rent seeking, by controlling/influencing government. 13 Also, it shares with the recent political economy and economic growth literature, the idea that resources devoted to rent seeking may be ultimately detrimental to growth. 14 Second, it relates to the unifying theory of Acemoglu (2006) who develops a general framework for analyzing the growth implications of politicoeconomic equilibria. Considering three groups of agents: workers, "elite" producers and "middle class" producers. Elite producers control the government and tax middle class producers through a distorting income tax and distribute the proceeds among themselves via a lump-sum transfer. 15 We share with Acemoglu (2006) both the strategic interactions in solving for a politicoeconomic equilibrium, as well as the notion of the 12 Trabandt and Uhlig (2010) and Bi and Traum (2014) find that this is the case for the Greek economy. 13 The idea that the various beneficiaries of government policies are more likely to get politically organized, whereas the interests of the un-organized general public are neglected is found in the pioneering works of Schattschneider (1935) , Tullock (2010) , Olson (1965) , Weingast et al. (1981) and Becker (1983 Becker ( , 1985 . 14 See Parente and Prescott (1994) , Krusell and Rios Rull (1996) , Aghion and Howitt (1998) , Angeletos and Kollintzas (2000) , Grossman and Helpman (2002), Haber, et al. (2003) , Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) and Acemoglu (2006 , 2009 . 15 Acemoglu's motives for increasing the distorting tax are three: (a) "Revenue extraction": the provision of resources for the benefit of the elite; (b) "Factor price manipulation": the lowering of factor prices used in the elite's production process; and (c) "Political consolidation": the impoverishment of middle class producers, so as to prevent them from acquiring the resources necessary to achieve political power. To anticipate the workings of our model, we may think of insiders as acting according to Acemoglu's three motives. The first and the third of these motives for increasing the distorting income tax, are captured by the need for the maintenance of the existing (old) and the creation of the new publicly provided infrastructure that ensures the funding for their employers businesses. The second motive is captured by the fact that an increase in the income tax rate, increases the user cost of capital and the wage rate of outsiders, lowering the demand for these factors and increasing the demand for services of intermediate good products. This, in turn, increases the demand for insiders' labor, in such a way so as to increase the wage premium in the public sector. Like in Acemoglu, it is this effect that seems to be the most damaging for the economy. However, there are important differences between Acemoglu's framework and the one developed herein. First, the roles of "elite entrepreneurs" and "middle class entrepreneurs" are taken, here, by "insiders" and "outsiders", that they are both workers. Second, since insiders are organized in unions, that set the wage rate, there is an additional distortion in our model's economy over and above the tax distortion. This additional distortion strengthens the "factor price manipulation" effect. Third, there is a fundamental nonlinearity, as an increase in the distorting tax rate, so as to increase the number of publicly provided intermediate goods, may be beneficial for the economy, if the number of existing publicly provided intermediate goods is relatively low and the opposite may be true, if the existing number of those goods is relatively high.
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"political elite". The latter is taken to make the political decisions and engage in economic activities. In our case, the political elite consists of the members of insiders' unions. However, our structure is richer than Acemoglu (2006) , as we allow for a positive effect on TFP, associated with the provision of publicly provided intermediate good products. Thus, government spending, in our model, is not pure waste. On the contrary, it generates a positive effect on TFP and output.
Third, it relates to the literature on models that distinguish between public and private employment, focusing on public-private wage determination. Forni and Giordano (2003) consider a static model of private and public sector wage determination. In their model there are many public and private firms and two unions representing public and private sector employees. They consider a variety of solutions for the game between the two unions and the firms. Our model shares with one of their solution concepts -that of a "fragmented government" -the notion that government consists of a variety of independent firms. There is also a number of dynamic general equilibrium models that examine the behavior of public and private sector wages over the business cycle (e.g., Ardagna (2007) , Fernandez de Cordoba, et al. (2012) ). Typically in this literature, wages in the public sector are determined as the outcome of a non-cooperative game between the union of public sector employees and a government that cares about total employment. As in this literature, our model has a key role for the public sector wage premium. However, we have chosen to determine this premium following the "cartel sector" model of Cole and Ohanian (2004) whereby labor is divided between groups of insiders and outsiders. And, as already noted, insiders and outsiders work for public (cartel) and private (competitive) sector firms, respectively, while government is influenced by insiders in setting public policies.
Fourth, it relates to the "varieties of capitalism" literature of political science, pioneered by Hall and Soskice (2001) , as well as Esping-Andersen's (1990) "three worlds of welfare capitalism" social model analysis. In this literature, it has been suggested that Greece as well as other Southern European countries have their own "variety" of capitalism, where the state plays a major role (see, e.g., Molina and Rhodes (2007) and Featherstone (2008) ). In a sense, the insiders-outsiders society idea is based on the institutional complementarity between market organizations, where the wage premium favors individual groups of society ("insiders") and the political system, where these groups control or influence government, for insiders' collective benefit. As already noted, this interaction has been emphasized on another strand of the political science literature, namely, that on "neo-corporatism" (Schmitter (1977) , Sargent (1985) , Cawson (1986) ).
Finally, our results should be of interest to the European integration question. Countries that have gone beyond a certain point toward the insiders-outsiders society, as Greece and possibly other Southern European countries might have, will experience difficulties following the others in after-9 tax TFP growth. 16 This outcome has already been suggested by several policy influential economists (see, e.g., Blanchard (2004) , Alesina and Giavazzi (2004) ).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the model. Section 3 establishes the main results of the paper. Section 4 discusses the model's explanation of the growth reversal and the stylized facts mentioned above and Section 5 concludes.
THE MODEL
Time is discrete and there is no uncertainty. The economy consists of a large number of identical households whose members supply labor and capital services and consume a final good.
This final good can either be consumed or invested and is produced by means of physical capital and labor services, as well as, the services of a number of intermediate goods provided by government. Household labor consists of two kinds: Labor supplied to the final good producers in a competitive market and labor supplied to the publicly provided intermediate goods through independent monopolistic labor unions. Moreover, these monopolistic unions cooperate in controlling/influencing all government policies. Household members supplying their labor competitively will be referred to as "outsiders" and household members supplying their labor through labor unions will be referred to as "insiders." And, the model economy will be referred to as the "insiders-outsiders society."   is the household discount factor, t c is consumption per capita in period t, and 1/ (0, )  is the constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Households own physical capital, that depreciates according to a fixed geometric depreciation rate, (0, 1]   and evolves according to
Households and Firms
is capital stock at the beginning of period t and t i is gross investment in period t. In every period t, each household has available a fixed amount of labor time, (0, ), h  that can be allocated to the production of the final good, Although our formulation of households allocating time among final and intermediate good sectors is admittedly a highly schematic one, as already mentioned, the reader may think of households having many members, where some are "insiders" and others are "outsiders." As will be made apparent below, the numbers of insiders and outsiders in our model are determined by the demand side (firms and unions), exclusively. Allowing insiders' layoffs, as in Cole and Ohanian (2004) , could determine the numbers of insiders and outsiders by the supply side (households), as well. For tractability purposes, we have chosen not to pursue this extension here. At any rate, in our model, as well as in Cole and Ohanian (2004) , there is perfect household insurance among household members, whether insiders or outsiders. Hence, the profoundly important income distribution effects of the insiders-outsiders society are, consequently, ignored. And, as is, of course, the important question of who chooses to become an insider and who ends up as an outsider, in the presence of these income distribution effects.
The budget constraint facing each household, in any given period t, is given by:
where: t  is the income tax rate in period t, t r is the rental rate of capital services in period t, o t w is the wage rate for labor time devoted to the production of the final good, () i t wz is the wage rate for labor time devoted to the production of services from the z intermediate good, in period t.
The representative household seeks a consumption, capital accumulation and time allocation plan so as to maximize lifetime utility, subject to the time and budget constraints, (1) and (2) 
Production in the final good sector takes place in a large number of identical firms. The production technology of the representative firm in this sector is:
A is a parameter that designates the level of (Harrod-neutral) technology at the beginning of period t and grows according to: Let () t pzbe the price for the services of the z intermediate good in period t. At the beginning of any given period t, the representative final good producer, maximizes profits:
taking all input prices and the number of intermediate good producers as given.
The (inverse) demand for the services from the z intermediate good is: 
13 where: () t Xz is output supplied in period t and () i t Lz is labor services used in period t. In any given period t, the representative producer of services from the z intermediate good chooses labor input, so as to achieve zero profits: 20
taking the production technology constraint (7), the demand for its services (6), the number of intermediate good producers, the labor input choices of all other intermediate good producers and wages as given. This gives the following (inverse) aggregate demand for labor in the production of services from the z intermediate good:
Clearly, given Assumption 1, this demand increases with the weighted average of the labor input in the production of services of all intermediate goods,
This formulation is consistent with Greek experience, where public utilities, transportation networks, and other publicly provided services are supplied by a single agency/firm that has a monopoly, but is heavily regulated. However, these agencies/firms end up behaving like unregulated monopolist, due to the behavior of the union that controls their labor input. 22 And this is the model feature we turn next.
Insiders' Unions
Labor used in the production of services from each intermediate good z is organized in a union. That is, there is a separate union z for each intermediate good z, for all z. We refer to these unions as "insiders' unions." Following the standard union literature, we assume that the preferences of the z union of insiders are characterized by the utility function
. This form of union preferences corresponds to the "utilitarian" model of McDonald and Solow (1981) and Oswald (1982) , where the representative union member has a constant relative rate of risk aversion, 20 This is not a crucial assumption and the propositions of this paper would go through with publicly provided intermediate good service producers having some other objective, like regulated profits. For simplicity purposes, this is not pursued in this paper. 21 The number of final good producers is irrelevant, in this model, due to the CRS production function in (4) and perfect competition. Moreover, the number of z intermediate good service producers is also irrelevant due to the CRS production function in (7) and the zero profit restriction. Thus, without loss of generality, (9) has been expressed in representative final good producers units. 22 A classic example is the Greek Power Company (ΔΕΗ), which although a de facto monopoly, has more or less zero profits, but its labor union (ΓΕΝΟΠ-ΔΕΗ) has substantial market and political power, that results in substantial wage premiums and other benefits for its members (See, e.g., Michas (2011), for a narrative).
provided that union membership is fixed. Here, union membership is determined by the union and is fixed and equal to employment in the production of services of the corresponding intermediate good sector. Further, 0 t w is the "alternative wage" for insiders, in the sense that, 0 () i tt w z w  is the wage premium of insiders over outsiders and at the same time the wage premium in the public sector. The latter, as already noted, are all those that work in the final good sector of the economy.
And, finally, () z  is a parameter that measures the relative preference of the wage premium over employment for the z union of insiders. As usual, we take () z  to stand for a measure of the union's relative bargaining power.
At the beginning of any given period t, the z union of insiders seeks a wage and employment plan so as to maximize its utility, subject to the aggregate demand for labor in the production of services from the z intermediate good (9); and, the institutional constraint:
In so doing, the z union of insiders takes the aggregate capital, the aggregate employment of outsiders, the wage and employment choices of all other unions of insiders and the number of intermediate good producers, as given.
be the elasticity of the demand for labor facing the z union of insiders. Then, provided that ( ) ( ), t zz   as we shall ensure below, there exists a unique solution to the problem of the z union of insiders, which is interior (i.e., ( ) ,
w z w L z  ) and such that there is a wage premium given by:
This is the well known tangency condition of the union indifference curve and the demand for labor facing that union. In this solution () 
Government Budget
The government's budget constraint, expressed in representative household units, in any given period t, is given by:
is the cost of administering and maintaining the existing z intermediate good infrastructure in period t. That is, the first term in the LHS of (11) should be thought of as the investment cost of new infrastructure and the second term in the LHS of (11) as the cost of maintaining the existing infrastructure.
and ˆ( ) t z  will be further specified, shortly.
Symmetric Equilibrium
For tractability purposes, in what follows we shall characterize the equilibrium in the symmetric case, where there are no differences across intermediate good service producers, the corresponding insiders' unions, and the distributions of (
More specifically, we assume:
The last two restrictions make investment in new infrastructure and maintenance of existing infrastructure, fixed functions of output per efficient household. Obviously, these are strong restrictions for analyzing business cycle effects. But, herebelow, they are not so restrictive, as we limit our attention in steady states and convergence towards these steady states. Also, the restriction   incorporates the notion that it is more expensive to develop than to maintain one unit of public sector infrastructure.
Then, the equilibrium of this economy, where all agents solve their respective problems and all markets clear, is characterized by the following set of equations:
and (1 )(1 )
Equations (12) and (13) give the allocation of total household time between final good and intermediate public good production and for that matter between insiders and outsiders, respectively. Equation (14) gives output in the neoclassical growth model format, so that () t N  , defined in Equation (18), is total factor productivity, in period t. Equations (15) and (16) , which is tantamount to the wage premium of insiders over outsiders. Clearly, the wage premium affects the economy's resource allocation through total factor productivity. The number of publicly provided intermediate goods, t N , affects total factor productivity both directly and indirectly through the wage premium. The former is associated to the variety effect and the latter to the misallocation effect, discussed in the Introduction. Hence, the number of publicly provided intermediate goods affects the economy's resource allocation, via after-tax total factor productivity,
, threefold: First, through the wage premium, second through the variety effect, and third through taxation. The latter is associated with what we shall refer to as the "political effect."
The Insiders' Wage Premium
To ensure that the wage premium of insiders over outsiders is greater than one, we need the following parameter restriction:
This simply implies that the demand for insiders' labor is downward slopping and puts a lower bound on t N . That is,
. Also, given λ (0,1)  , Assumptions 1 and 2 ensure that
, and it follows from (17) that the wage premium is greater than one. Moreover, in view of Assumption 1: wage rate. And, there is no wage premium (i.e., ( ) 1 t vN  ). Alternatively, the latter will hold in this model, under two possibilities. First, when 0   , that is when the union does not care about the 18 wage premium. And second, when    , that is when the union faces an horizontal demand for labor.
In view of (12) and (13), an immediate implication of Proposition 1 is the following:
Corollary 1: Given Assumptions 1 and 2, the ratio of employment in the publicly provided intermediate goods sector (i.e., public employment, i tt Nh) over total employment, and employment in the final good sector (i.e., private employment, o t h ) over total employment decrease and increase, respectively, with the public sector wage premium and reach their maximum and minimum values, respectively when there is no wage premium.
When ( ) 1 t vN  , the monopolistic unions restrict labor input, so as to receive a higher wage rate. This result relates to what we refer to as the "labor misallocation" effect, to whose implications we turn next. 24
Total Factor Productivity
Given Proposition 1, total factor productivity, () t N  , is positive. As already mentioned, ). It follows from (18) that 24 Much like the standard insiders-outsiders labor market theory suggests, this model can easily account for outsiders' unemployment, by introducing a minimum wage rate which is greater than 0 t w and increases the reservation wage of insiders. In fact, the higher the wage premium in the public sector, the stronger the "misallocation" effect and the lower the demand for outsiders labor, implying greater unemployment amongst outsiders, for any given minimum wage rate.
. Given Assumptions 1 and 2, 1
. Therefore, given Assumptions 1 and 2, 
Proposition 2 (Properties of Total Factor Productivity): Given Assumptions 1 and 2,
(1
Proof: In the Appendix.
That is, given gross complementarity (i.e., Assumption 1) and unions facing downward sloping labor demand (i.e., Assumption 2), the "variety" effect dominates over the "labor misallocation" effect. To further illustrate the implications of this "labor misallocation" effect, associated with the equilibrium considered in the previous subsections, it is instructive to consider the Second Best associated with this equilibrium. In this model, there are two reasons that the equilibrium is not Pareto Optimum: Proportional income taxes and the market power of insiders' unions. Thus, we shall focus our attention to characterizing efficiency losses with respect to a "Second Best" outcome. That is, a situation where there is distorting taxation, but there is no insiders-outsiders organization of society. In this case, of course, there are no insiders' unions and there is no relative wage premium, nor a "labor misallocation" effect. Formally, we define as a "Second Best" outcome for this economy an equilibrium, where the relative wage premium
Second Best is also characterized by (12) - (17), with TFP given by:
. Consider now the TFP difference function:
(1 )
We may think of () As a consequence of the labor misallocation effect, the TFP gap increases with both the public sector wage premium and the number of publicly provided intermediate goods. 
Growth with a Fixed Number of Publicly Provided Intermediate Goods
. Also, it follows by the above two equations that the transitional dynamics around this steady state are as indicated by the directions of the arrows in Figure 4 . Following standard arguments, it can be shown that there exists a unique stable local trajectory to the steady state, to which the economy converges, monotonically.
Given any initial value of 
Proposition 3 (Variety and Labor Misallocation Effects vs Tax Distortion Effect): Given
Assumptions 1 and 2,
, such that:
Since,  should be a relatively small number, the condition
, puts an upper bound on  , that seems reasonable for all practical purposes. For that matter, we shall refer to
as the threshold value of N.
Proposition 3 can be illustrated in Figure 4 , also. In this case, an increase in N that decreases (increases) low N, an increase in this number is associated with the dominance of the "variety" effect over the combination of the "labor misallocation" and "tax distortion" effects. On the contrary, for a relatively high N, an increase in this number is associated with the dominance of the combination of the "labor misallocation" and "tax distortion" effects over the "variety" effect. For, as it can be easily verified, the "variety" effect ("labor misallocation" and "tax distortion" effects) is decreasing (are increasing) with N. The important implication of this result for the stylized facts of the Introduction, will be discussed in the next section.
Government's Objective Function
The stage has, now, been set to investigate the case of an endogenous income tax rate or an 
And, the temporal utility function of the representative household becomes logarithmic, so that the objective function of the representative household and the so called Median Voter Government is given by:
The problem of the Median Voter Government is to find a plan of the form   11 0 , tt t kN    so as to maximize (21), subject to (20) . We shall refer to the solution of this problem as the Median Voter politicoeconomic equilibrium. It should be mentioned that the government budget constraint, is such that choosing the number of intermediate goods in the beginning of period t+1 completely determines the income tax rate. Thus, this politicoeconomic equilibrium assumes that there is a commitment technology with respect to the income tax rate. 26 Second, motivated by the Greek paradigm, where political parties and governments have been dominated by unions and especially those of the greater public sector, we wish to consider a situation where insiders' unions are controlling government. 27 We shall refer to this type of government as Government of Insiders. But since in the equilibrium considered in the previous subsection and, in particular, in the Nash equilibrium characterizing the outcome of the insiders' unions strategic interaction, we assumed that each union takes the number of publicly provided intermediate goods as given and beyond their control, it seems contradictory to argue that unions cooperate to control/influence government. 28 However, there is no such contradiction. Unions "play" non-cooperatively vis-à-vis each other with respect to the wage rate, as an increase in the wage rate set by each union affects positively its own utility but negatively each other union. This is because, such an increase, due to the assumed gross complementarity, lowers labor demand facing all other unions. However, they still have an incentive to cooperate in influencing the income tax rate / the number of publicly provided intermediate goods. This is because a higher, say, income tax rate, increases the number of publicly provided intermediate goods and increases the demand for labor facing each union, also due to gross complementarity. Hence, all insiders' unions have an incentive to increase this tax rate (financing of the underlying infrastructure). For that matter, unions' interests are simultaneously to compete for wage premiums and cooperate for the number of publicly provided intermediate goods. On the contrary, however, in a world of no insiders, there is no need for such cooperation. We consider then the objective function of Insiders Government to be a function of the sum of utilities of all insiders' unions,
, which in the symmetric case reduces to:
The problem of the Government of Insiders is to find a plan of the form   Further, since we are interested in comparing societies with different politicoeconomic structures, we wish to consider a hybrid of the government objective functions introduced above.
That is, following the political economy literature (see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini (2002) , Ch. 7),
we consider a government that to some degree is influenced by representative household preferences and is influenced, likewise, by insiders' unions preferences. Thus, to avoid scale problems, we consider a government that seeks to minimize a weighted average of the percentage , the Hybrid equilibrium represents a politicoeconomic equilibrium with any given degree of insiders influence over the representative household in government decisions.
POLITICOECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we characterize the basic properties of the Hybrid politicoeconomic equilibrium. The following is the main result of this paper. 
Then, given Assumptions 1 and 2:
(a) The Hybrid politicoeconomic equilibrium is characterized by (20) and
associated with this equilibrium, such that: 27) and N  is the unique solution to:
(c) Moreover, an increase in the relative influence of insiders' unions, 1   , would lead to a higher steady state value, N  . Proof: In the Appendix. 30 Difference equations (20) and (25) is strictly positive, strictly decreasing, strictly concave , approaches  as
and becomes zero at 1 N  . These properties of () N  imply that there exists a unique solution to (28) that
gives the number of publicly provided intermediate goods in the steady state. In Figure 5 this steady state is in the intersection of the 
the "tax distortion" effects, the Government of Insiders chooses that number so as to balance the same effects but with greater values for these effects, due to the utility gains from the public sector wage premium and government's share of output. For that matter, the Government of Insiders chooses a greater number of intermediate goods than the Median Voter social planner. In fact, as Part c of Proposition 4 makes clear, generally, an increase in insiders influence over government,   1   , would imply a higher steady state number of publicly provided intermediate goods. For that matter and as illustrated in Figure 5 , N  falls always between MV N and GI N . Next, we turn on steady state capital, given by (27) . Combining Propositions 3 and 4, it is apparent that there is no direct answer to the question whether there will be a higher or a lower steady state capital in the Median Voter social planner solution relative to the Government of Insiders solution. Nor, in the case of the Hybrid politicoeconomic equilibrium, how steady state capital will vary with an increase in the influence of insiders over government. In particular, for relatively low numbers of steady state publicly provided intermediate goods, N  , an increase in insiders influence over government, leading to a higher number of those goods in the steady state, may entail higher steady state capital and faster growth (i.e., growth along the convergence to the steady state). But, for a relatively higher number of steady state publicly provided intermediate goods,
N  , a higher number for these goods leads to lower steady state output and growth. We summarize this important result in the following corollary. 
Unfortunately, no clear cut answer can be obtained if N  is in the sub-interval of relatively large N and N  is in the sub-interval of relatively low N . Proposition 4 is helpful in explaining the stylized facts of the Introduction. For, if countries differ with respect to 1   (i.e., the relative weight of insiders in influencing the government), countries with high 1   will eventually have a high number of publicly provided intermediate goods and these countries will be more likely to have a number of publicly provided intermediate goods which is higher than the threshold of Proposition 3. Then these countries will have lower steady state capital and output, than countries with relatively low 1   .
We conclude this section with establishing that the Hybrid politicoeconomic equilibrium is at least asymptotically stable around the steady state. In particular, it is characterized by a sequence of numbers of publicly provided intermediate goods,   0 t t N   , converging monotonically to the steady state, for any 0 N , sufficiently close to N .
be the solution to (25) for any given 0 N and let N be the unique steady state defined by (28) . Around this steady state, the first order approximation of the solution to (25),
where, (20) and (29) that around the steady state ( , ) kN of the politicoeconomic equilibrium, the law of motion of capital can be approximated by:
And, since 0 ,
0       and therefore the convergence of capital is also monotonic.
STYLIZED FACTS EXPLANATIONS AND THE CASE OF A GROWTH REVERSAL
Recall from Proposition 4, that an increase in insiders influence over government (i.e., 1   )
will lead to an increase in the steady state number of publicly provided intermediate goods, N .
Further, recall from Proposition 3 that steady state TFP, 
Figure 6: A Growth Reversal
In Figure 6 , the horizontal axis measures capital in the current period and the vertical axis measures capital in the next period. For any given ( , ) tt kN in the current period, capital in the next period is given by
, like point A in Figure 6 . The steady state of capital is given by the intersection of the 45 0 line and the locus
Suppose, now, that NN  , where N is the threshold value (i.e., 
It also follows, as it can be readily seen from (30), that as long as 1 tt NN   , next period capital will be given by a higher transition locus than that giving the current period capital. It follows that capital is moving along a rising trajectory, like the dotted line in Figure 4 . Suppose, now, that while capital is at C, there is an increase in insiders influence, . For precisely the same reasons like the ones used to establish the dotted trajectory, now capital will follow a falling trajectory, like the dashed trajectory from C to D, establishing the growth reversal in the case of a rising influence of insiders over government.
This growth reversal possibility serves as an explanation of what may have occurred in Greece. That is, the growth reversal observed in Figure 1 might be simply a consequence of the increasing influence of insiders in Greek society. In the model's framework, one may think of Greece, as a country with a low initial level of N , but with a progressively higher 1   , as insiders' influence over government grew stronger. Thus, about forty years ago, the advent of the insiders-outsiders society in Greece, which was at a lower stage of development and was lacking adequate infrastructures, may have helped the economy to develop and grow. This happened precisely because, it led to the public provision of that infrastructure, when the private provision of the latter seemed infeasible. But, eventually, the insiders-outsiders society may have exceeded its usefulness and insiders' unions enjoyed substantial wage premia, leading to labor misallocation and tax distortion and/or high debt, that caused the Greek crisis. 31 31 Most Southern European countries exhibited negative growth for a number of years after the 2008 crisis. According to our theory, the growth reversal is an outcome that should follow a period of relatively low growth. Clearly, Greece conforms to this prediction, with a very deep recession following a period of meagre growth. A similar but more gentle pattern characterizes the other South European countries, as well.
In fact, the overwhelming resistance and procrastination of public sector unions and practically all Greek governments in recent years in the implementation of the reforms requested by Greece's lenders incorporated in the various bailout programs (memorandum of understanding -"μνημόνια") can clearly be attributed to the very existence of the insiders-outsiders society as described in this paper.
An indication of the increase in the influence of insiders over government in Greece is the very high public sector wage premia as seen below in Figure 7 . 32 Also, credence to the validity of the model are the stylized facts reported in Figure 8 . Namely, that wages in the public sector relative to the private sector are not only high but these wage differentials correlate negatively with general government employment over total employees, total factor productivity, and output growth. 33 32 The public sector wage premium is defined as the ratio of the average wage rate in the public sector over the average wage rate in the private sector. An even more dramatic picture would have emerged, if time series data on the average wage rate in public sector enterprises were available (which, to our knowledge, are not). This would be the case especially for Greece where circumstantial evidence (e.g., annual reports of the National Electric Power Company (ΔΕΗ)) suggests that wages in the public sector enterprises are considerably higher than average public sector wages (See Kollintzas, et al. (2016) ) 33 The substantial public sector wage premium in Greece is also a feature identified in micro-data and remain a persisting feature even in the advent of the recent crisis (See e.g. Christopoulou and Monastiriotis (2014) and (2016)). Also, recently, there have been several studies that show empirically that, not only Greece, but also Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Ireland exhibit higher public sector wage premia than other Euro Area countries. See, for example, Giordano et al. (2011) Note: Data sources and definitions in the Appendix.
First, the wage premium in the public sector is justified and related to union power, production technology, especially the degree of complementarity among publicly provided intermediate goods and the degree of government involvement in the economy, with the number of publicly provided intermediate goods thought to be a proxy of the latter (Proposition 1). Second, it provides for an explanation for the negative correlation between public sector wage premium and the ratio of public over total employment (Corollary 1). Third, it provides for an explanation for the negative correlation between public sector wage premium and after tax TFP (Proposition 3) .
Finally, the negative correlation between public sector wage premium and output growth can be decomposed into two parts: for a given country over time, it can be explained by growth reversal arguments similar to the ones discussed above, brought about by the advent of the insiders-outsiders society. And, for different countries, this negative correlation can be attributed to the degree their economies are characterized by the insiders-outsiders society. For example, one may think of Greece or other South European countries having very high  and very high 1   , so that the threshold of N , in Proposition 3, is exceeded, while countries with very low or non-existent wage premia in the public sector, the Anglo-Saxon countries (except Australia before the millennium), for example, having very low  and very low 1   , so that steady state N is below this threshold. For some other countries the model's structure may be altogether inappropriate. For example, the Nordic countries, where wage premia in the public sector are practically negligible, have very strong unions in both public and private sectors, but their unions co-operate to internalize the cost to the economy associated with a high wage premium in one industry or sector. 34 In our model's jargon this, practically means that outsiders behave like insiders and the Government of Insiders behaves like the Median Voter. All of these cases (as well as other questions, see, e.g., footnote 15), 34 however, could be addressed by an extension of our model that incorporates a sector of privately provided intermediate goods and their corresponding unions, along the lines of Cole and Ohanian (2004) . In such an environment, we could also incorporate professional associations and the regulated prices and tax breaks they manage to get for their members. In a way, the present model can be readily modified to incorporate these professional associations. For example, treating a fixed number of professional associations as unions of intermediate good producers, that each one of them behaves like a monopolist in their respective market and all together cooperate so as to get tax breaks, results in a simplified version of our model, where, in the symmetric case, there is a fixed wage premium enjoyed by professional association members; and there is a tax rate gap between professional association members and the rest of society, that is increasing in the share of government spending over GDP. Last but not least, it would be interesting to complement the above framework with the incorporation of a political economy mechanism that determines who wins elections and forms a government and investigate how the allocation of insiders and outsiders is affected by such a mechanism.
CONCLUSIONS
In a synthesis of the insiders-outsiders labor market structure and the concept of an elite government, we constructed a dynamic general equilibrium model of market and political power interactions that can explain the growth reversal characterizing Greece in recent years. In this country public sector unions act independently in their respective markets, but co-operate to influence government policies, including those that affect public sector infrastructures. In so doing, they increase taxes and/or debt to inefficient levels. Moreover, the model is consistent with several stylized facts pertaining to the wage premium in the public sector, such as: the negative correlation between the public sector wage premium, on the one hand, and the ratio of public sector employment over total employment, total factor productivity, and output growth, on the other hand. Finally, this model may be of interest to understand growth performance in other developed or developing countries sharing similar institutional frictions with Greece.
APPENDIX

Proof of Proposition 2
Part a
Given Assumptions 1 and 2, ( ) 
. Therefore, it follows from
and consider  as a function of ( ) 1 v v N  . That is, let:
And, therefore, given Assumptions 1 and 2,
 
(1 )(1 ) 1 11
2 (1 ) (
Part b
Differentiate () N  with respect to N , to get:
Clearly, then, given Assumptions 1 and 2, 
Proof of Proposition 3
Note that:
(1 ) ( ) 0
  Therefore, in view of (A.2.1) and (A.2.2), we have: In this case, of course, Figure A.1) .
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 4
Part a
The Euler -Lagrange conditions associated with the Hybrid politicoeconomic equilibrium are given by: 
where t  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (20).
In view of (20), (A.5.1) can be rewritten as: Then, in view of (A.5.5), (A.5.2) gives: To prove the existence and uniqueness of the steady state, first note that the RHS of (A.4.10) is a positive constant, Q.E.D. Figure 1 : Greece versus the OECD average . Annual data over the period 1970-2015. GDP per head is in constant 2010 prices, constant PPPs (in US dollars). OECD average includes all member countries of the OECD. The HP trend is obtained using a smoothing parameter of 100. For the counterfactual case, we assume that Greek GDP (in market prices) after 1979 grows at the same rate as the growth rate of the OECD average GDP (in market prices). All series with the exception of the real per capita GDP growth rate have been detrended using the Hodrick Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter λ=100.
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